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Affirmative Action: A Mock
Supreme Court Opinion on
Abigail Noel Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin
By: Collin Marino, Arcadia University
Affirmative Action has been the cause
of legal debate since its inception in the early
1960s. Though some view these policies as a
means of equaling the playing field between
the minority and the majority, there are those
who see these policies as greatly disadvantaging the majority as well. This is exactly the
scenario which brought about the Supreme
Court case of Abigail Noel Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin. Abigail Fisher
applied to the University of Texas and was
denied admission, something she felt was due
to the University’s affirmative action policies.
The Court, in theory, has used quasi-strict
scrutiny to determine whether or not the
policies adopted by the various universities or
organizations are constitutional. This is the
test that should be used in the Court’s opinion
of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, and
this test will further the constitutionality of
the University of Texas’ AI/PAI system.
Before 1997, the in-state admissions
process of the University of Texas at Austin
(UT) considered only two factors: (1) an
applicant’s Academic Index (AI), which was
computed from standardized test scores and
high school class rank; and (2) the applicant’s
race. Race was often a “controlling factor in
admissions.” (App. at 5) (citing, App. 162a.).
What this means is that, often, University’s
would grant admission simply due to the race
of the applicants, possibly regardless of
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academic standing or standardized test scores.
The use of race in the PAI system ended with
the Fifth Circuit Court’s decision in Hopwood v
Texas, 78 F.3d. 932 (5th Cir. 1996). In an effort
to maintain the rates of minority enrollment it
had before the Hopwood decision was passed,
the University of Texas decided to adjust its
criteria for admission. In 1997, UT developed
its AI-based admissions calculus with a new
Personal Achievement Index (PAI).
The PAI system consisted of a weighted
average of two written essays and a “personal achievement score.” The PAI “measures
a student’s leadership and work experience,
awards, extracurricular activities, community
service,” and “special circumstances.” These
special circumstances—including being raised
in a single-parent, non-English speaking, or
socioeconomically disadvantaged home
environment or assuming significant family
responsibilities—tended to “disproportionately
affect minority candidates.” Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D.
Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011)
Coexistent with the PAI system created
by UT, the Texas Legislature passed the Top
10% law as their own response to the Hopwood
decision. This law required UT to grant
automatic admission to any Texas high school
student graduating in the top 10% of their
class. This plan took effect for the first time in

the 1998 admissions cycle. In addition to the
Top 10% law, UT’s AI/PAI system would be
used to (1) fill those seats in the entering class
that were not taken up by those admitted
through the Top 10% and (2) determine program placement for all students of the incoming freshman class. The combined effect of the
Top 10% Law and the AI/PAI system steadily
increased African-American and Hispanic
admissions. In 1999, UT announced that its
“enrollment levels for African American and
Hispanic freshman… returned to those of
1996, the year before the Hopwood decision.”
On June 23, 2003, the same day the
Supreme Court announced its decision in
Grutter v. Bollinger1, UT announced that it
would “modify its admission procedures to ...
combine the benefits of the Top 10% Law with
affirmative action programs that can produce
even greater diversity.” Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, (2003). This modification was a
proposal, created in 2004, to re-consider race
in the admissions process, and it was approved
by the University’s Board of Regents that
same year. This proposal was set forth for two
reasons (1) to overcome “significant
differences between the racial and ethnic
makeup of [UT’s] undergraduate population
and the state’s population and (2) to achieve
classroom diversity. The 2004 Proposal was
designed so that UT could achieve the same
interest that this Court had just reaffirmed
was compelling in Grutter—the “educational
values of diversity.”
UT determined that the study and the
demographic imbalance between its freshman
class and the overall demographic of the state
showed that they had not yet met a “critical
mass” of diversity. The 2004 Proposal also
claimed that although the race-neutral
policies—such as the Top 10% law—had been

useful in obtaining a strong academic student
body, it failed to improve to overall diversity
in the classroom. The proposal was approved
by the Regents and in 2004, UT reintroduced
racial preferences by adding race to the list of
possible “special circumstances” that make up
a major component of the PAI. This policy was
first introduced with the admissions class of
2005.
Abigail Noel Fisher was a white female
from the state of Texas. She applied for undergraduate admission to the University of Texas
in 2008. Fisher was not in the top ten percent
of her class, which would have guaranteed her
admission into the school under the Top 10%
law. Because of this, she was forced to compete
for admission with other non-Top Ten Percent
in-state applicants. The University of Texas
denied Fisher’s application. She then enrolled
at, and graduated from, Louisiana State
University (LSU). After being denied admission to UT in 2008, Fisher filed suit in the
Western District of Texas for damages and
injunctive relief to challenge UT’s use of race
in admissions under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution provides that
“no State shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST., AMDT. 14 § 2. When this Court
analyzes a case under Equal Protection it must
ask itself four things (1) How is the government drawing a distinction among people, (2)
How does it discriminate?, (3) What level of
scrutiny applies?, and (4) Does government
action need that level of scrutiny? The third
question provides the Supreme Court’s root for
analysis regarding classifications that
distinguish protected classes.

Grutter v. Bollinger upheld the use of affirmative action in collegiate admissions. The Court was asked to review whether the admissions policies used
by the University of Michigan, in which race was allowed to be considered as a factor of admissions, was constitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
1
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The Court has three different levels of scrutiny
that it uses to review state or federal
distinctions of classes, and each of these levels
has its own requirements that a statute,
policy, or law must satisfy in order to be held
constitutional. The Supreme Court of the
United States has consistently held that any
discrimination by the government based on
race “must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.” Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Thus,
the statute must serve a compelling state
interest and be narrowly tailored to that
interest. Strict scrutiny is applied to all racial
classifications in order to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant the use of a highly suspect tool.”
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989).
Although all uses of race-based discrimination
by the government are to be analyzed under
strict scrutiny, not every action by the government is invalidated by this analysis. The fact
that a certain law may be racially discriminatory “says nothing about the ultimate validity
of any particular law; that determination is
the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.”
Peña, 515 U.S. at 230, 115 S.Ct. 2097. As long
as the law or statute serves a compelling state
interest and is narrowly tailored to that
interest, it will pass strict scrutiny every time
and will be considered a valid law under the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
For the past two decades, however,
this Court has been applying another form of
scrutiny in its decisions in Affirmative Action
cases, such as Grutter and Bakke. This form,
which has often been labeled quasi-strict
scrutiny, does not look into whether the issue
is narrowly tailored. Rather, so long as the
Affirmative Action program serves to pro-
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mote diversity but not create a direct, but-for
causal link between the suspect class and the
underlying benefits sought, then the discrimination serves a compelling state interest and
the means are substantially related to that
interest. Quasi-strict scrutiny will only apply
to Affirmative Action cases where the discrimination is being used facially. For example, the
Top 10% plan would not fall under this level
of scrutiny since it applies to all races, not one
suspect class. The Top 10% plan may have this
result, and may very well have this purpose,
but because this affects all races across the
board, is neutral on its face, and benefits all
suspect classes and/or races, then it shall not
be above rational relation.
Under strict scrutiny alone, which
requires the statute in question to serve a
compelling state interest and also be narrowly tailored, the AI/PAI system created by UT
would fail under the requirement for narrow
tailoring. Narrowly tailored requires that
there be no other way the objective could be
reached. In the context of Affirmative Action,
being narrowly tailored is possible in theory
but impossible in action, as Affirmative Action
applies to all colleges and universities across
the United States, each with their varying
size and popularity. What may be considered
a “diversity goal” at one college or university
may not be the same at another. Here, the Top
10% law was created to achieve diversity at
UT, as was the AI/PAI system created by UT
themselves. These two systems were created to achieve the goal of diversity at UT, yet
neither can pass muster as narrowly tailored
because neither one is the only way to achieve
diversity. While never formally pronounced,
this alternative level of quasi-scrutiny has in
theory been applied in the previous rulings of
this Court, such as Bakke and Grutter, and we
will be well served to apply it in this case.

The Court believes that under quasi-strict scrutiny, the requirement that the
process must serve a compelling state or
government interest is met by the AI/PAI
system created by UT. As stated above, this
Court has endorsed Justice Powell’s view, in
Grutter specifically, that “student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that
can justify the use of race in university
admissions.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 325 (2003). Petitioner argues that UT
never clearly articulated a compelling interest
in educational diversity. As Respondent points
out, “UT simply seeks minority students with
different backgrounds, different experiences,
and different perspectives. That is precisely
the diversity that this Court has held universities have a compelling interest in seeking.”
(Rep. at 15). In light of this, the Court
endorses Justice Powell’s view in Marks, and
on that endorsement, agrees with the Respondent’s point on the compelling interest of the
University. This Court, as well as other institutions in this country, has noted that student
body diversity, in and of itself, is a compelling
state interest. This is due to the added
benefits, some of which UT even mentioned
in their 2004 Proposal, that are accomplished
with diversity. Some of these benefits, as mentioned by UT itself, of the AI/PAI system is
that it seeks to “provide an educational setting
that fosters cross-racial understanding,
provides enlightened discussion and learning, and prepares students to function in an
increasingly diverse workforce and society”.
(Rep. at 26).
The interest of UT, as stated above, is
the overall interest in student body diversity
at the university. When the 2004 Proposal was
first considered, UT ran a study throughout
the university in order to assess their current
levels of diversity. According to the Respon-
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dent, “UT’s study showed that there were zero
or one African-American students in 90% of
the undergraduate classrooms of the most
typical size (5-24 students). The classroom
diversity study itself stated that UT’s objective
was the educational benefits of diversity, not
some discrete “‘classroom diversity’ target”.
(Rep. at 26, 27). UT is a large university in
Texas, with many classrooms that fall within
this “most typical size” that was surveyed. For
there to be one, and sometimes not even one,
African-American student in 90% of the classrooms is a grave cause for concern for UT and
justifies a compelling interest for the
university. We therefore find that this system
passes the compelling interest requirement,
and turn to consideration of substantial
relation and the but-for test.
From the very beginning, it is evident
that this system created by UT is substantially
related to the interest of diversity at the University. Through the consideration of race in
the application process, as well as the “special
circumstances” aspect, it is evident that these
aspects were implemented with the effect and
purpose of increasing diversity at UT. Petitioner argues that “where racial classifications
have only a ‘minimal impact’ in advancing
the compelling interest, it ‘casts doubt on the
necessity of using such classifications” in the
first place and demonstrates that race-neutral
alternatives would have worked about as well.
(App. at 46-47) (citing, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701. at 734 (2007). We find this
argument unpersuasive, and rather endorse
Judge Garza’s view, in his dissent in the Fifth
Circuit, that “diversity cannot be gauged with
reference to numbers alone,” and “a raceconscious admissions plan need not have a
‘dramatic or lopsided impact’ on minority
enrollment numbers to survive strict scrutiny”.

Finally, when considering the but-for
test, UT’s policy must make sure that it serves
to promote diversity, which this Court has
already stated it does, but does not create a
direct, but-for causal link between the suspect
class and the underlying benefits sought. That
benefit in this case being admission into the
University of Texas. As the Respondent, UT,
points out, its admissions process is “not all
about race. UT appreciates that every student
brings a lot of other diversity pieces with them.
Race…simply provides a contextual background for the student’s achievements… The
point of holistic review is that [s]tudents ... are
more than just their race.” (Rep. at 34). Rather
than using race in a situation where there is
a direct causal link between the suspect class
and the underlying benefits sought, such as
the quota system, it is nothing more than an
extra consideration for admission professionals to look at when making decisions for the
remaining 25% of seats not covered by the Top
10% Rule. We therefore conclude our analysis.
However, we also find that the UT Policy
satisfies the but-for test and thus fully satisfies
all three parts of the quasi-strict scrutiny.
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In this case, the Supreme Court has
been called on to determine whether the UT
admissions policy is constitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title IV of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. In this instance, a case arising
due to Affirmative Action policy, we reaffirm
our prior rulings and once again state that the
appropriate test is that of quasi-strict scrutiny.
It is therefore the determination of this Court,
that the UT admissions policy serves a
compelling state interest. As this Court has
consistently found, and continues to find today,
student body diversity is a compelling state
interest. Furthermore, the plan is substantially related to that interest, as it was created for
the purpose, and also has the effect of
increasing diversity at the institution. To be
sure, this plan does not serve as a but-for
causal link between the suspect class and the
underlying benefit sought, as we find that the
use of race is just another consideration in the
admissions process. In light of the above, the
Supreme Court hold that the UT admissions
policy, created for the purpose of increasing
student body diversity, is nothing short of
constitutional.
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